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ANTARCTICA: AN INTERNATIONAL LABORATORY 
Colin Deihl* 
May this continent, the last explored by humankind, be the first one 
to be spared by humankind. Out of the errors of the past, may there 
rise a dawn of respect and love for the free-living creatures and pristine 
beauty of the last virgin land on Earthr---Antarctica. 
Jacques-Yves Cousteau1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 1988, the member nations of the Antarctic Treaty System2 
signed, but did not ratify, the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA).3 CRAMRA's 
purpose is to establish a regime governing the exploration and ex-
ploitation of minerals in Antarctica while simultaneously preserving 
, Associate, Faegre & Benson, Denver, Colorado. B.A., Univerity of Vermont, 1984; J.D., 
Harvard Law School, 1990. 
I Antarctica: Highest, Coldest, Darkest, Driest, CALYPSO LOG, Apr. 1989, at 12 [hereinafter 
CALYPSO LOG]. 
2 See generally Multilateral Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 
4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]. As of June 1988, 19 nations were voting 
members of the Antarctic Treaty System. These voting members, referred to as "Consultative 
Parties," were Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, German Democratic Re-
public, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and 
Uruguay. 
In addition to the Consultative Parties, thirteen "Contracting Parties," or "Non-Consulta-
tive Parties," initialed CRAMRA. These parties are nations that have agreed to the terms of 
the Treaty System, but have not done sufficient scientific research to become Consultative 
Parties. The Contracting Parties were Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Finland, Greece, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Romania, and 
Sweden. 
:l Convention on the RegUlation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for sig-
nature Nov. 25, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 [hereinafter CRAMRA]. 
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Antarctica's pristine environment. 4 CRAMRA has generated criti-
cism from environmentalists who believe that it would allow oil 
companies to begin test drilling on the Antarctic continental shelf. 
These critics contend that ratification of CRAMRA will lead to the 
continent's ruin. Largely because of the environmentalists' criticism, 
CRAMRA probably never will be ratified. At the most recent Ant-
arctic Treaty system meeting in December 1990, CRAMRA had lost 
most of its earlier support. 5 Only Japan continued to support 
CRAMRA in its original form.6 Consequently, CRAMRA did not 
have sufficient support to be introduced for ratification. 7 
CRAMRA and the accompanying controversy over Antarctic oil 
exploration deserve close examination. In many respects Antarctica 
represents a microcosm of global environmental problems. No nation 
legitimately can claim sovereignty over the Antarctic continent; 
therefore, its environmental problems must be solved in the same 
manner that the world's environmental problems must be solved-
through treaties and unilateral actions. As a result, Antarctica can 
serve as an accurate laboratory for international environmental law. 
The conflict over the future of Antarctica encapsulates many of the 
key political issues of the 1990s: environmentalism versus economic 
growth, the developing nations versus the industrial powers, and 
international cooperation versus unilateral action. 
This Article's purpose is to determine how Antarctica's environ-
ment best can be protected. Proponents of CRAMRA believe that 
the Antarctic Treaty members need to enter into a minerals regime 
in order to avoid an unregulated gold rush in Antarctica. They argue 
that only by ratifying a minerals regime will Treaty members be 
able to control and regulate mineral exploitation in Antarctica. Crit-
ics of CRAMRA advocate a complete ban on mineral exploration and 
exploitation. They propose that setting aside Antarctica as a World 
Park is the only way to protect Antarctica's environment. 
This Article examines both the World Park proposal and 
CRAMRA to determine which is better for the Antarctic environ-
ment. Although the Article discusses geopolitical influences, it only 
looks at these influences as they affect environmental protection. 
Section II of this Article describes Antarctic geography, geology, 
4 [d., preamble, at 868. 
5 See Crawford, Antarctic Conference Ends in Dismal Failure, Fin. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, 
§ 1, at 2. 
6 See Hunt, Campaign for Mining Ban Splits Antarctic Nations, The Independent, Dec. 
6, 1990, at 15. 
7 [d. 
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and politics, providing an introduction to the physical realities of 
Antarctica. Section III explains the Antarctic Treaty System and 
examines CRAMRA. To a large extent, CRAMRA has shaped the 
current controversy over Antarctica's future. Moreover, although 
CRAMRA has lost almost all of its supporters, it remains important 
since there is still a slight possibility that the Treaty members may 
decide to use it as the basis for a new minerals agreement. Section 
III also evaluates the concept, proposed by CRAMRA's critics, of a 
World Park. Section IV compares the views of those who support a 
minerals regime like CRAMRA with the views of those who support 
setting aside the continent as a World Park. The purpose of section 
IV is to analyze critically the two dominant perspectives shaping the 
debate over Antarctica and to determine which perspective, if 
adopted, would be protective of Antarctica's environment. This Ar-
ticle concludes that the best way to prevent the despoliation of 
Antarctica is to follow the recommendations of environmentalists 
and to prohibit minerals exploration in the Antarctic region perma-
nently. 
II. THE PHYSICAL CONTINENT 
A. Geography 
The isolation of Antarctica, combined with the harshness of its 
climate, must be considerations in any plan to drill for oil or mine 
for minerals. Antarctica's extreme environment makes minerals ex-
ploration there more difficult than anywhere else on earth. More-
over, the harsh Antarctic environment will magnify the environmen-
tal impacts of any mineral exploration. 8 
Of the seven continents, Antarctica is the least hospitable to hu-
man activities. 9 It is the coldest continent on earth.1O Summer tem-
peratures average about 00 centigrade along the coast and -200 
centigrade in the interior. Winter temperatures average about -200 
centigrade along the coast and -650 centigrade in the interior.11 The 
average year-round temperature in the coastal regions is -150 cen-
H See Bogart, On Thin Ice: Can Antarctica Survive The Gold Rush?, GREENPEACE, Sept.-
Oct. 1988, at 7, 8. 
9 U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, POLAR PROSPECTS: A MINERALS TREATY 
FOR ANTARCTICA 126 (1989) [hereinafter POLAR PROSPECTS]. 
IU U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 35-39 (1978). 
11 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 126. 
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tigrade. 12 The lowest temperature ever recorded on earth, -89.6° 
centigrade, was recorded on July 21, 1983, at the Soviet Union's 
Volstock station. 13 These extreme temperatures are aggravated by 
continual high winds with wind speeds often exceeding 200 kilome-
ters per hour.14 During a severe storm in 1960, scientists estimated 
that gusts exceeded 250 kilometers per hour (140 miles per hour).15 
Anyone proposing minerals exploitation on Antarctica also must 
take into account the continent's magnitude. The Antarctic continent 
and its surrounding oceans cover an enormous area. It is the fifth 
largest continent, covering about 5.4 million square miles or approx-
imately ten percent of the earth's surface. 16 Ninety-nine percent of 
Antarctica's area is covered in a layer of ice. 17 This icecap contains 
seventy percent of the world's fresh water and ninety percent of its 
ice. 18 On average, the icecap is 1600 meters thick. 19 If the icecap 
melted completely, it would raise the level of the world's sea level 
by fifty-five meters.20 The icecap extends beyond the continent's 
coastline as ice shelves. The largest such shelf, the Ross Ice Shelf, 
is the size of France. 21 Occasionally, huge chunks of the ice shelf 
break away and float into the Southern Ocean, presenting enormous 
hazards to ships transiting the area. 22 
Antarctica is also isolated. South America is 1000 kilometers (620 
miles) away across the roughest stretch of water in the world. Aus-
tralia is 2500 kilometers (1550 miles) away, and Africa is 4000 kilo-
meters (2500 miles) away.23 The continent and its ice shelves are 
separated from the rest of the world by a barrier of shifting pack 
ice and a stormy Southern Ocean. The pack ice varies in size ac-
cording to the seasons. In summer, its ice shrinks and breaks apart, 
forming channels that can be kept clear for ships. In winter, it can 
extend as far north as Tierra del Fuego in South America. During 
severe winters its expansion can double the size of Antarctica's 
summer ice cover.24 
12 Id. 
13 J. MAY, THE GREENPEACE BOOK OF ANTARCTICA 16 (1988). 
14 B. BREWSTER, ANTARCTICA: WILDERNESS AT RISK 5 (1982). 
15 13 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 847 (15th ed. 1975). 
16 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 126. 
17 J. MAY, supra note 13, at 16. 
18 POLAR REGIONS ATLAS, supra note 10, at 35. 
19 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at l. 
20 POLAR REGIONS ATLAS, supra note 10, at 36. 
21 J. MAY, supra note 13, at 30. 
22 Swithinbank, The Ice Shelves, in ANTARCTICA 202 (T. Hatherton ed. 1965). 
2.1 J. MAY, supra note 13, at 18. 
24 H. KING, THE ANTARCTIC 2 (1969). 
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B. Potential Mineral Resources 
Despite the obvious difficulties associated with attempting any 
mineral extraction in such a harsh and remote continent, numerous 
countries and multinational corporations have expressed interest in 
exploring Antarctica for mineral wealth. 25 Although there are no 
known commercially valuable deposits of either hydrocarbons or 
hard minerals in Antarctica, many scientists believe that Antarctica 
may contain economically valuable mineral resources. 26 This belief is 
based on a geological theory known as plate tectonics. 
According to plate tectonics theory, the earth is made up of rigid 
plates that move with respect to one another a few centimeters per 
year.27 Approximately 200 million years ago, the continents of the 
Southern Hemisphere were joined together into a supercontinent 
known as Gondwanaland. 28 One way of accessing Antarctica's poten-
tial mineral wealth is by analogizing to the mineral wealth found on 
the continents that once were joined to Antarctica. 29 
According to geologists, Australia, India, and parts of southern 
Africa once were joined with eastern Antarctica. All of these areas 
2' As early as 1969, the governments of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
were approached by commercial interests for prospecting rights in Antarctica. In 1969, New 
Zealand received an application for developing a large area for petroleum. In 1970, Texaco 
asked the United States how it could obtain a license for oil exploration in the Atlantic section 
of Antarctica. In 1979-1980, Gulf was reported to have had a survey ship working in the 
South Georgia area, and the company proposed joint surveys between the government and 
private companies. As a global strategy, Gulf "is raising cash to carry out the huge programme 
of [Antarctic] exploration that alone will ensure its survival as a leading force in the world's 
oil supply." B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 90. See also Friedheim & Akaha, Antarctic 
Resources and International Law: Japan, the United States, and the Future of Antarctica, 
16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 119, 133-34 (1989) (reporting that in 1975, Texas Geophysical requested 
from the United States exclusive rights to explore the Ross and Weddell Seas, but was turned 
down). 
Several nations also have engaged in mineral exploration in Antarctica. The United States, 
Norway, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and Poland all have been 
searching recently for oil under the guise of purely scientific research despite a moratorium 
on commercial exploration for resources. See Luard, Who Owns the Antarctic, 1984 FOREIGN 
AFF. 1175. In 1985, the German ship Polarstern found evidence that rock just beneath the 
sea floor contained organic material suggestive of petroleum at lower depths. In late 1986, a 
New Zealand team drilled into the Ross Sea and found a six-foot-thick layer of sand stained 
by a waxy hydrocarbon residue indicating that petroleum had existed there in the past. See 
Mitchell, Undermining Antarctica: A Pact to Regulate Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica 
Threatens That Unique Environment, TECH. REV., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 48. More recently, 
the Japanese Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) has been exploring for 
minerals in the seas surrounding Antarctica. See Friedheim & Akaha, supra, at 138. 
26 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 93. 
27 See generally Elliot, Tectronics of Antarctica: A Review, 275A AM. J. SCI. 45 (1976). 
2" Id. 
29 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 99. 
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contain Precambrian Shield rocks that hold some of the world's most 
valuable mineral deposits. Minimal exploration in Antarctica has 
revealed that the continent contains huge quantities of coal, as well 
as deposits of platinum, chromite, copper, molybdenum, gold, silver, 
and many other minerals. 30 Nevertheless, minerals experts think 
that the price of these minerals would have to rise substantially 
before they would become commercially exploitable. 31 
Currently, no one knows if any valuable hydrocarbon deposits 
exist. Nevertheless, interest in Antarctic oil has been building since 
a United States scientific drilling ship, the Glomar Challenger, dis-
covered the presence of gaseous hydrocarbons in three out of four 
holes drilled in the Ross Sea continental shelf.32 Although, the ap-
pearance of hydrocarbons does not indicate necessarily the presence 
of commercial oil or gas deposits,33 scientists consider the Ross Sea 
area promising for future oil and gas exploration. According to cur-
rent theories about Gondwanaland, the Ross Sea once adjoined the 
Gippsland basin of Australia. 34 In 1974 that area of Australia had 
proven reserves of 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 220 billion cubic 
meters of gas. 35 
Without more drilling, estimates of oil reserves are not likely to 
be accurate. 36 Nevertheless, estimates have been widely quoted. 37 
In 1974 and again in 1983, the United States Geologic Survey studied 
Antarctica's mineral potential. 38 This research, known as the Wright-
Williams Report,39 estimated that the Ross Sea area contained forty-
five billion barrels of oil, of which only fifteen billion barrels could 
be extracted. 40 This amount of oil is comparable to the amount of oil 
on the United States Atlantic continental shelf and less than the 
thirty to sixty billion barrels believed to be off the coast of Alaska. 41 
30 For a discussion of the current knowledge of hard mineral wealth in Antarctica, see D. 
SHAPELY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE 134-45 (1985). 
31 See id. at 138-39. 
32 I d. at 124. 
33 Id. 
34 I d. at 130. 
35 Id. 
36 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 107-09. 
37 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 89. 
38 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 124-25. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. In 1979, a representative of Gulf Oil stated that the oil potential of the two most 
likely areas in the Ross and Weddell Seas was in the range of 50 billion barrels, but probably 
much more. By comparison, the North Slope oilfield of Alaska is believed to contain 8 billion 
barrels. Id. 
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Although these published estimates appear to be fueling the inter-
national quest for Antarctic minerals, there is no way to know the 
petroleum potential of the offshore basins without further study of 
the underlying geology. 42 
C. Commercial Viability 
Drilling for oil in Antarctica may become technologically feasible. 
Recent scientific drilling demonstrates that offshore geologic surveys 
are possible using existing technology.43 Furthermore, the past de-
cade has witnessed the oil industry's entry into increasingly chal-
lenging environments such as the North Sea, the coast of Labrador, 
and the Beaufort Sea. 44 Proponents of Antarctic mineral exploration 
point to the success of oil drilling operations in the Arctic as an 
indication that such drilling will become technologically feasible in 
the Antarctic. 45 
Nevertheless, drilling will be more difficult in the Antarctic than 
in the Arctic. The Ross Sea differs from the Arctic in several ways. 
Most importantly, the waters off Antarctica are very deep. Expe-
rience in the Arctic, most notably in the Beaufort Sea, has been 
limited to shallow inshore waters.46 Because of the pressures of high 
winds and ice, companies operating in the Beaufort Sea have used 
artificial gravel islands instead of the conventional drilling platforms. 
Such islands would be impossible in the Antarctic, where the water 
depth is an average of ten to twenty times deeper than that of the 
Arctic. 47 Furthermore, the waves in the Beaufort Sea are moderate 
compared to the waves of the Ross Sea. 48 Finally, the icebergs 
encountered in Antarctica are gigantic. Although crews operating 
off the coast of Labrador have developed methods to avoid icebergs 
while operating oil platforms, those methods are not applicable to 
the Antarctic due to the immense size of Antarctic icebergs.49 The 
only existing option is to make the drilling rigs capable of quick 
evacuation. 50 These gigantic icebergs often scour the seabed in the 
42 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 89. 
43 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 124. 
44 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 93. 
45 See F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 248 (1982). 
46 A. PARSONS, ANTARCTICA: THE NEXT DECADE 91 (1987). 
47 [d. 
4R [d. 
49 [d. at 92. 
50 [d. 
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Antarctic. As a result, sub-sea pipelines and wellheads will have to 
be buried below the depth of maximum scour to be protected. 51 
Even if technology could be developed that would allow operators 
to drill safely in the Antarctic, there would still be enormous prob-
lems associated with oil production. Because of the build-up of ice in 
the winter months, the whole production system would have to be 
below the surface and would have to function nine months of the 
year without surface maintenance. 52 Additionally, there would be 
tremendous problems designing and building a storage and export 
facility. There are no analogous oil producing areas anywhere in the 
world. 
D. Antarctica's Significance 
Antarctica's importance may not be immediately apparent. Ant-
arctica is no person's home. Most of the continent is covered by a 
frozen ice sheet that supports very limited life forms. Although the 
surrounding ocean is home to a complex and varied ecosystem, it is 
separated from the rest of the planet, and consequently there is little 
danger that human life will be threatened. Nevertheless, the integ-
rity of the Antarctic environment is important for at least three 
reasons. First, Antarctica is important to scientists. Second, it plays 
a major role in stabilizing the planetary environment. Finally, Ant-
arctica is one of the last remaining wilderness areas on earth. 
1. Scientific Value 
Antarctica's importance as a scientific laboratory was recognized 
officially by the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. 53 Article II 
of the Treaty states that freedom of scientific investigation and 
cooperation shall continue. 54 Moreover, all scientific research is sup-
posed to be shared. 55 As a result, Antarctica is host to some fifty 
science stations operated by twenty-one different countries. The 
largest such station, the United States' McMurdo Station, is home 
to approximately 1200 scientists during the summer months. 56 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 93. 
&3 See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text. 
54 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. II, 12 U.S.T. at 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 2,402 
U.N.T.S. at 74. 
55 Id. art. III, 12 U.S.T. at 796, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 3,402 U.N.T.S. at 74 (stating that 
scientific program plans, personnel, observations and results shall be freely exchanged). 
56 Bogart, supra note 8, at 37. 
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Antarctica offers scientists ideal opportunities to study global en-
vironmental problems, including sea-level change, global climate, 
and global levels of atmospheric constituents such as ozone. In recent 
years, Antarctica's importance as a scientific laboratory increased 
due to greater awareness of these problems. Antarctica's isolation 
from the rest of the planet, combined with its harsh climate, makes 
it relatively unaffected by man. Therefore, it provides a base line 
for studies on global pollution of various kinds. 57 
Antarctica already has provided scientists with a number of im-
portant findings. Its snow and ice contain a history of the earth's 
pollution levels over the last few hundred thousand years. 58 The 
discovery of a hole in the ozone was made by Antarctic scientists. 59 
Antarctic scientists are able to monitor global warming by measuring 
carbon dioxide levels in the otherwise unpolluted Antarctic atmo-
sphere. 60 Theories about the impact of the greenhouse effect on the 
global sea level came from research in Antarctica. 61 By studying the 
West Antarctic Ice Sheet, scientists were able to determine that a 
temperature rise of five degrees centigrade will cause the ice shelves 
to disintegrate, leading to a rise of five meters in the world's sea 
level. 62 Antarctica's importance as a scientific laboratory depends on 
the existence of a relatively undisturbed ecosystem. 63 Negative im-
pacts of mineral exploration might threaten the continent's scientific 
value. 64 
2. Global Significance 
Scientists have just begun to understand Antarctica's importance 
in stabilizing the global environment. Antarctica represents the plan-
et's thermostat. Even in mid-summer, the Antarctic atmosphere 
serves as a global heat sink, drawing warm air from other continents 
and thus keeping them cooler than they otherwise would be. 65 Fur-
thermore, its volume of ice effectively controls world sea level. 66 
57 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 37. 
5H See CALYPSO LOG, supra note 1, at 14. 
59 Hall, The World's Frozen Clean Room, Bus. WK., Jan. 22, 1990, at 72. 
60 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 37, 39. 
"lId. at 39. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 37. 
64 [d. at 47. 
65 Id. at 38. 
66 See id. at 38-39. 
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The seas surrounding Antarctica are also important. The Southern 
Ocean teems with tiny zooplankton called krill. 67 The principal Ant-
arctic krill concentrations lie within 200 miles of the continent in an 
area geologists believe is promising for oil exploration. 68 Almost all 
the other species in the Southern Ocean depend on krill for survival. 
Many predator species, such as whales, migrate throughout the 
world. Thus, a decrease in the population of the Antarctic krill would 
cause a decline in whale species worldwide. 69 
3. Wilderness 
Several environmental organizations argue that mineral explora-
tion should be banned from Antarctica because of the continent's 
significance as one of the last undisturbed areas on the earth's sur-
face. 70 In many ways this "wilderness argument" mirrors the two 
previous arguments. The argument from science stresses Antarc-
tica's importance as a base line study area.71 The argument about 
the Antarctic's importance in balancing the glGbal environment 
stresses the vital role Antarctica plays in keeping the planet livable. 72 
Both of those arguments emphasize Antarctica's benefit for human 
science and research. 
The wilderness argument, in contrast to others, contends that the 
continent should be protected regardless of its scientific or global 
importance because it is important to preserve some areas of the 
planet from the influence of humanity.73 Preserving the natural state 
of Antarctica could benefit humankind. For example, one could argue 
that Antarctica must be preserved so that future generations can 
experience what "true" wilderness is like. By keeping part of the 
planet unaffected by human intervention, future generations will be 
able to assess the changes that man has wrought to determine their 
relative value and harm. Nonetheless, at its root the wilderness 
argument is not based in utilitarianism. Rather, those who argue for 
67 "Krill are delicate, transparent, shrimp-like animals, pink or ocher in color, and measuring 
3 to 5 centimeters long with knobby eyes and phosphorescent lights about their legs. They 
tend to swarm near the surface by day appearing as great reddish patches; their nighttime 
swarms look like twinkling underwater galaxies." For more detailed information and photo-
graphs, see J. MAY, supra note 13, at 80-81. 
58 See B. BREWSTER, supra note 14. 
69 Id. at 8. 
70 J. MAY, supra note 13, at 158. 
71 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
73 See J. MAY, supra note 13, at 158. 
1991] ANTARCTICA 433 
preserving Antarctica as wilderness believe that some areas of the 
planet are sacred and should be left alone. 
III. THE LEGAL REGIME 
A. The Antarctic Treaty 
The Antarctic Treaty was a natural outgrowth of the history of 
the continent. After a period of exploration, colonial powers began 
to claim parts of Antarctica. By the mid-1950s, seven countries-
Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom-had laid claim to sections of the continent based upon the 
notions of discovery, occupation, geographic connections, and his-
toric rights. 74 The claimants divided the continent into slices radiat-
ing from the South Pole. 75 The British, Chilean, and Argentine claims 
overlapped. 76 Five other countries-Belgium, Japan, South Africa, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States-operated in Antarctica, 
but refrained from making any claims of territory.77 These five na-
tions also refused to honor claims made by the others. 78 
In 1957-1958, the twelve nations active in Antarctica participated 
in a year of scientific cooperation and experimentation known as the 
International Geophysical Year. 79 This cooperation led to the nego-
tiation of the Antarctic Treaty.80 The Treaty protects the continent 
as a research preserve with nations freely exchanging scientific in-
formation. The Treaty applies to the area south of sixty degrees 
latitude, including ice shelves, but not to the areas of high seas, 
where the rights of international law controls.81 
To ensure friendly relations, the Treaty parties agreed that "Ant-
arctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only," and they banned 
"any measures of a military nature. "82 The Treaty also created the 
world's first nuclear free zone. 83 To further the atmosphere of co-
operation, the Treaty provides for the free exchange of scientific 
74 See D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 66-68. 
75 Id. at 68. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 67-68, 78-82. 
76 Id. at 63-64, 77-82. 
79 Id. at 83. 
80 See id. at 89. 
81 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 28. 
82 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, 12 U.S.T. at 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 2, 402 
U.N.T.S. at 72. 
83 Id. art. V, 12 U.S.T. at 796, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 3,402 U.N.T.S. at 76. 
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information, personnel, and observations. 84 It also provides for ver-
ification procedures, under which "all areas of Antarctica, including 
all stations, installations and equipment ... and all ships and aircraft 
at points of discharging or embarking cargoes and personnel in Ant-
arctica . . . shall be open at all times to inspection" by observers 
designated by anyone Consultative Party. 85 
Article IV of the Treaty solved, at least temporarily, the deepest 
conflict between the Treaty parties-conflicts between those claim-
ing sovereignty and those who refused to recognize those claims. 
Article IV states: 
Nothing contained in the present Treaty ... nor acts or activities 
taking place while the Treaty is in force . . . shall prejudice the 
respective positions of the parties in regard to territorial claims 
or constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim 
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of 
sovereignty . . . .86 
Article IV helped to stabilize a web of competing national interests: 
among claimants; between claimants and nonclaimants; between the 
superpowers; and between rich nations able to maintain Antarctic 
presences and smaller ones, like Belgium and South Africa, which 
barely have done SO.87 By ignoring the sovereignty issue, the Con-
sultative Parties were able to create a Treaty System. 
The Treaty's most impressive achievement has been its durability. 
This durability is due largely to Article IX. Article IX calls for 
regular meetings "at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose 
of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of com-
mon interest pertaining to Antarctica and formulating, considering 
and recommending to their Governments measures in furtherance 
84 Article III reads: 
In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarc-
tica as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree 
that, to the greatest extent feasible and practical: (a) information regarding plans for 
scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy 
and efficiency of operation; (b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica 
between expeditions and stations; (c) scientific observations and results from Ant-
arctica shall be exchanged and made freely available. 
[d. art. III, 12 U.S.T. at 796, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 3,402 U.N.T.S. at 74. 
85 [d. art. VII, 12 U.S.T. at 797, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4,402 U.N.T.S. at 76. A "Consul-
tative Party" is a nation that has adopted the Treaty and been acknowledged a voting member 
because of its "substantial scientific research activity on the continent." [d. 
86 [d. art. IV, 12 U.S.T. at 796, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 3,402 U.N.T.S. at 74. 
87 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 94. 
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of the principles and objectives of the Treaty."88 Because of Article 
IX, a series of meetings have been held since 1959. These meetings 
have resulted in a comprehensive system of rules and regulations 
known as the Antarctic Treaty System.89 The Antarctic Treaty Sys-
tem includes three formal treaties that the Consultative Parties have 
negotiated, adopted, and ratified. It also includes numerous less 
formal agreements known as recommendations. 90 These additional 
recommendations and treaties fill gaps left by the original Treaty. 
In 1964, the Consultative Parties adopted the first of these trea-
ties, the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna 
and Flora. The Agreed Measures protects native Antarctic mammals 
and birds and preserves several areas as off limits from human 
interference. 91 In 1972, the Consultative Parties adopted the second 
treaty, the London Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals. This Convention prohibits the taking of some seal species and 
sets quotas on other species. Enforcement depends on self-policing 
by the signatory nations. 92 In 1980, in response to heavy fishing, the 
Consultative Parties adopted the Canberra Convention on the Con-
servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR).93 
CAMLR calls for the conservation and management of all living 
resources within Antarctica's ecosystem. Like the Seal Convention, 
enforcement is left to the individual nations. 
The Antarctic Treaty peacefully coordinated all the nations with 
interests in Antarctica. Unfortunately, it has several significant 
88 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, 12 U.S.T. at 798, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 5, 402 
U.N.T.S. at 78. 
89 See POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 45. 
9() Id. at 44. Nearly 150 recommendations have been adopted since the Treaty went into 
affect. A wide range of activities are now regulated, including: 
-{!ooperation in meteorology and in the exchange of meteorological data 
-cooperation in telecommunications, including procedures for communicating among 
stations in Antarctica 
-{!ooperation in air transport and logistics 
-{!ontrol of tourism, including development of guidance for visitors to Antarctica 
-a recommended code of conduct for stations in Antarctica and recommendations 
for developing procedures to assess impacts of operations 
-the preservation of historical sites 
91 W.M. BUSH, 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (1982). 
92 See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature June 1, 
1972,29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826, 11 I.L.M. 251; see also Siniff, Living Resources: 
Seals, OCEANUS, Summer 1988, at 71-74. 
93 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 
T.I.A.S. No. 10,240, 19 I.L.M. 841. For comment, see Lagoni, Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Model for the Use of a Common Good?, in ANT-
ARCTIC CHALLENGE 93-108 (Wolfrum ed. 1984). 
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weaknesses. First, some observers contend that the Treaty creates 
an exclusive club giving the wealthier nations control over Antarc-
tica. 94 Although Article VIII permits any member of the United 
Nations to accede to the treaty by ratifying it, a nation cannot 
become a voting member of the Treaty (a Consultative Party) unless 
it engages in "substantial scientific research activity."95 Currently 
thirty-nine nations have acceded, of which twenty-two are Consul-
tative Parties. 96 More than three-fourths of the world's population 
is now represented. 97 Nevertheless, to become a Consultative Party, 
a nation must be wealthy enough to undertake a scientific research 
program. 98 
A second weakness is the Treaty System's lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. Because the Treaty ignores territorial claims, it is 
difficult to determine which nations are responsible for environmen-
tal problems. Consultative Parties have been hesitant to criticize 
each other's environmental records. For example, in the early 1980s 
the French started to construct an airfield at Dumont d'U rville in 
an area they had claimed in the years before the Treaty.99 While 
preparing the landing strip, they injured and killed many penguins 
and other birds and destroyed the habitat of others.10o None of the 
Consultative Parties responded to the French actions. 101 The French 
government stopped the project only after Greenpeace put pressure 
on them. 102 The lack of any enforcement provisions in the Treaty can 
94 G. TRIGGS, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME 64 (1987). 
95 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, 12 U.S.T. at 798, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 5,402 
U.N.T.S. at 79. 
96 Since 1959, the following 10 nations have become Consultative Parties: Poland (1977), 
Federal Republic of Germany (1981), Brazil (1983), India (1983), People's Republic of China 
(1985), Uruguay (1985), German Democratic Republic (1987), Italy (1988), Spain (1988), and 
Sweden (1988). In addition, the following nations have acceded to the Treaty without con-
ducting "sufficient scientific activity" to become a Consultative Party: Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, The Netherlands, Rumania, Bulgaria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Hungary, Finland, 
Cuba, Republic of Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Greece, Austria, Ecuador, 
Canada, and Colombia. 
It is worth noting that almost all of the acceding members and all of the Consultative Parties 
did not join until after the oil crisis of 1973 and after "scientific exploration" established that 
Antarctica probably contains a fairly significant amount of petroleum. 
97 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 45. 
98 In recent years, India, Brazil, China, Uruguay, Poland, Italy, West Germany, and East 
Germany have become Consultative Parties, meaning they now can participate in the deci-
sionmaking process. 
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result in significant environmental damage before any international 
pressure is exerted. 
B. CRAMRA 
CRAMRA is the most recent treaty signed by the Consultative 
Parties. After it was negotiated, CRAMRA was heralded as "one of 
the strongest pacts of environmental protection that has ever been 
negotiated. "103 However, support for CRAMRA has waned. At the 
most recent Antarctic Treaty meeting held in Chile in December 
1990, the Treaty members divided over the issue of future mineral 
exploitation in Antarctica.104 Approximately ten nations wanted a 
permanent ban on mineral exploration. 105 Others, led by Britain and 
Japan, wanted to revive CRAMRA.106 At the present time, 
CRAMRA does not have the votes it needs to be ratified and prob-
ably never will be revived. 107 Instead, a majority of the Consultative 
Parties support the World Park proposal. 108 
Despite its current lack of support, CRAMRA still represents one 
possible solution to dealing with future mineral exploitation conflicts. 
Moreover, it has been at the center of the current controversy over 
the future of Antarctica. Many nations, including the United States, 
supported CRAMRA until recently.109 Some of these nations still 
support some kind of minerals regime. As a result, CRAMRA may 
be utilized by negotiators as a framework for any future minerals 
negotiations. CRAMRA presents a possible solution to the uncer-
tainty about the validity of mineral prospecting in Antarctica. 
CRAMRA's proponents contend that CRAMRA will protect the 
environment while easing tensions over mineral development. Fur-
thermore, they argue that the World Park proposal is unrealistic in 
light of our global demand for scarce resources. 110 By addressing 
103 Hall, supra note 59, at 72. 
104 Crawford, supra note 5, at 8. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 6, at 15. 
108 The Independent reports that New Zealand, Australia, and France led a group of 10 
nations who support a permanent ban on mineral exploitation; the United States and Norway 
believe the parties should pass a binding moratorium on mining, followed by a regulatory 
framework. Id. 
109 Hall, supra note 59, at 72. 
110 See, e.g., Tetzeli, Allocation of Mineral Resources in Antarctica: Problems and a 
Possible Solution, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 525, 539-41 (1987); Rich, A Minerals 
Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L COMPo L.Q. 709 (1982). The United States government also 
argued in favor of CRAMRA. See, e.g., POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9. 
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both environmental and mineral concerns, CRAMRA will allow the 
Treaty System to remain intact. Because CRAMRA is the result of 
years of negotiations, the Consultative Parties may have difficulty 
formulating such an agreement again. 111 
The history of minerals negotiations supports the arguments of 
CRAMRA's proponents. When the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated 
in 1959, the minerals issue was so controversial that the subject of 
minerals exploration and exploitation was ignored. If it had been 
pursued, the parties would not have agreed to a Treaty at al1. 112 
Partially in response to concerns about minerals development, the 
original signatories to the Treaty agreed that the Treaty would run 
for only thirty years, at which time it would be open to review and 
renegotiation. 113 From 1959 until 1972, it was not even possible to 
discuss the subject of minerals exploitation at any of the Consultative 
Meetings. 114 The combination of the shock from oil shortages in the 
mid-1970s and the growing knowledge of the potential for oil in 
offshore Antarctic areas made it increasingly difficult for Treaty 
members to ignore the minerals issue. ll5 Knowing that the Treaty 
would be open for renegotiation in 1991, and feeling increased inter-
national pressure from the developing world in the United Nations 
General Assembly, the Consultative Parties began to fear that if 
they did not address the minerals issue, the international community 
might make it more difficult for them to control Antarctic policy. 116 
CRAMRA was negotiated in this political climate. 117 
The first real action on the minerals question was taken at the 
Ninth Consultative Meeting in London in 1977. At that time, the 
Consultative Parties were receiving criticism from the United N a-
tions General Assembly for their domination of Antarctic matters. 
After the Law of the Sea Conference in 1974, the "Group of 77"118 
voted to establish a one-nation, one-vote organization to oversee 
deep-sea mining.119 The Group of 77 then turned their attention to 
Antarctica. They argued that the continent should be incorporated 
111 See infra notes 114-127. 
112 Roberts, International Co-operation for Antarctic Development: The Test for the Ant-
arctic Treaty, 19 POLAR REC. 107, 111 (1978). 
113 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 97. 
114 Roberts, supra note 112, at Ill. 
115 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 158. 
116 I d. at 218. 
117 I d. at 162. 
118 See generally D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 149. 
119 The tenn "The Group of 77" refers to a group of 112 developing nations who were 
organized at the time of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which 
began in 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. 
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into the Law of the Sea Conference as part of the common heritage 
of mankind. 120 The Group of 77 argued that the United Nations 
should govern Antarctica according to a one-nation, one-vote orga-
nization. The Group of 77's demands frightened the Consultative 
Parties into beginning serious minerals negotiations. 121 The Consul-
tative Parties did not want the United Nations to assert any influ-
ence over the region and resisted any suggestion that the United 
Nations should act with respect to Antarctica. 122 As a result, the 
Consultative Parties adopted a policy known as "voluntary re-
straint."123 Under this policy, they agreed to "urge their nationals 
and other States to refrain from all exploration and exploitation of 
Antarctic mineral resources while making ... timely adoption of an 
agreed regime concerning Antarctic mineral resource activities. "124 
On June 2, 1988, after six years of negotiations, CRAMRA was 
adopted. 125 CRAMRA seeks to balance the Antarctic Treaty's inter-
est in protecting the environment with creating a workable system 
for the development of mineral resources. 126 At the same time that 
CRAMRA was adopted, the Consultative Parties reaffirmed the 
"voluntary restraint" policy in an agreement known as the Final Act 
of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting on 
Antarctic Mineral Resources (Final Act). 127 The Final Act explicitly 
continues the policy of voluntary restraint, but goes even further by 
prohibiting prospecting. 128 
Although all of the Consultative Parties signed and initialed 
CRAMRA, it cannot come into force until it is ratified by sixteen of 
the twenty parties. 129 The sixteen ratifying Consultative Parties 
must include five developing and eleven developed countries. 130 The 
regime set up by CRAMRA does not contain a detailed mining code. 
120 D. SHAPELY, supra note 30, at 150. 
121 [d. at 218. 
122 [d. at 150. 
12" For a complete discussion of Recommendation IX-I, the recommendation that all Treaty 
parties restrain from any minerals exploration until a minerals regime is negotiated, see W.M. 
BUSH, 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 343-47 (1982). 
124 Id. at 345, para. 8. 
125 For the complete text of the Convention, see CRAMRA, supra note 3. 
126 CRAMRA defines mineral resources as "all non-living natural non-renewable resources, 
including fossil fuels, metallic and non-metallic minerals." [d. art. 1, para. 6, 27 I.L.M. at 869. 
127 June 2,1988,27 I.L.M. 865 [hereinafter Final Actl. Many nations, however, have ignored 
the "voluntary restraint" agreement by conducting prospecting surveys of the hitherto unex-
plored Antarctic continental shelf under the guise of scientific studies. See D. SHAPELY, supra 
note 30, at 139. 
12H Final Act, supra note 127, at 865. 
129 CRAMRA, supra note 3, art. 62, para. 1,27 I.L.M. at 896. 
lao [d. 
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Rather, it sets basic standards for mineral exploitation and leaves 
the creation of more detailed guidelines to the new institutions es-
tablished by the Convention. 
1. CRAMRA Institutions 
The first and most important institution of CRAMRA is the Ant-
arctic Mineral Resources Commission (Commission). 131 The Commis-
sion is charged with the administration of possible mineral resource 
activities in Antarctica. 132 The Commission decides which areas in 
Antarctica should be opened up for possible mineral exploration and 
development. 133 It also is charged with designating areas where 
mineral resource activities will be prohibited. 134 The Commission has 
the authority to place environmental conditions and guidelines on 
areas it opens for exploration. 135 It is also responsible for all bud-
getary matters,136 including all fees and levies,137 and the disposition 
of all revenues. 138 
The Commission is the only decisionmaking body set up by 
CRAMRA to which all of the Consultative Parties belong. Along 
with the Consultative Parties, other parties to the Convention that 
either currently are engaged in substantial research relevant to 
mineral resource activities, or currently are sponsoring Antarctic 
mineral resource exploration or development, are also members of 
the Commission. 139 Therefore, voting membership in the Commission 
is open to all countries who have previously operated in Antarctica, 
as well as all those who have the resources to conduct substantial 
research or to engage in mineral resource activities. 
On substantive matters, Commission decisions are taken by a 
three-fourths majority vote. 140 A decision to identify an area for 
exploration and development and decisions on budgetary matters 
require consensus. 141 Under the Antarctic Treaty, consensus is de-
fined as the absence of a formal objection.142 Procedural questions 
131 Id. art. 18, para. 1, 27 I.L.M. at 876. 
132 Id. art. 21, para. 1,27 I.L.M. at 878-79. 
133 Id. art. 21, para. 1(d), 27 I.L.M. at 878. 
134 Id. art. 21, para. l(b), 27 I.L.M. at 878. 
135 Id. art. 21, para. 1(e), 27 I.L.M. at 878. 
136 Id. art. 21, para. 1(0),27 I.L.M. at 878. 
137 Id. art. 21, paras. 1(p), (q), 27 I.L.M. at 878. 
138 Id. art. 21, para. 1(r), 27 I.L.M. at 878. 
139 Id. art. 18, para. 2, 27 I.L.M. at 876-77. 
140 Id. art. 22, para. 1, 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
141 Id. art. 22, paras. 2(a), (e), 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
142 Id. art. 22, para. 5, 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
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are decided by a simple majority vote. 143 When a question arises as 
to whether a matter is one of substance or not, that matter is treated 
as one of substance unless otherwise decided by a three-fourths 
majority of the members present and voting. 144 
If the Commission decides to open an area for exploration and 
development, the Commission will appoint a Regulatory Committee 
for that area. 145 Each Committee will consist of ten members selected 
from Commission members, four of which must be claimants and six 
of which must be nonclaimants. 146 Included on the Committee must 
be the members that have made claims in the area being consid-
ered,147 as well as the United States and the Soviet Union. 148 Three 
of the ten members must be developing countries. In addition to 
these ten members, the Commission member that proposed opening 
the area is added as a member if it is not already chosen under the 
preceding guidelines. 149 The proposing member will remain a mem-
ber until an application for exploration is lodged. Those parties that 
lodge application permits and those parties whose applications result 
in approved Management Schemes remain Committee members 
while they are operating in the area. 150 
A Regulatory Committee is responsible for overseeing its assigned 
geographical area.l5l It promulgates detailed requirements for ex-
ploration and development consistent with the guidelines of the Com-
mission. 152 The Regulatory Committee is the primary manager of its 
assigned area and has the power to set the conduct of operators in 
its area,153 to issue or deny exploration permits, to enter into con-
tracts with developers, and to suspend, modify, or cancel con-
tracts. 154 In many ways the decisions of the Committee are final 
because the Commission is limited in its ability to overturn Com-
mittee decisions. 155 
143 Id. art. 22, para. 3, 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
144 Id. art. 22, para. 1, 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
145 Id. art. 29, para. 1, 27 I.L.M. at 882. 
146 Id. art. 29, para. 2(c), 27 I.L.M. at 882. A claimant is a nation that has made a claim to 
a portion of Antarctica. 
147 Id. art. 29, para. 2(a), 27 I.L.M. at 882. 
148 Id. art. 29, para. 2(b), 27 I.L.M. at 882. 
149 Id. art. 29, para. 6(a), 27 I.L.M. at 882-83. 
150 Id. art. 29, para. 6(b), 27 I.L.M. at 883. A Management Scheme grants a party an 
exclusive right to exploration and prescribes the terms and conditions with which the party 
must comply in order to maintain such rights. Id. art. 47, 27 I.L.M. at 891. 
151 Id. art. 31, 27 I.L.M. at 883. 
152 Id. arts. 43(3), 47, 27 I.L.M. at 889, 891. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. arts. 31(le), 51, 54, 27 I.L.M. at 883, 892-93, 893-94. 
155 Id. art. 49, 27 I.L.M. at 892. Article 49 gives the Commission the right to review the 
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Three other institutions are envisioned by CRAMRA: the Special 
Meeting of Parties, the Secretariat, and the Advisory Committee. 156 
These institutions do not make decisions, but nevertheless have some 
input into the decisionmaking process. The Special Meeting of Par-
ties is composed of all parties to CRAMRA.157 The Special Meeting's 
only purpose is to present its views about whether a particular area 
should be opened. It is designed to give input in decisions of the 
Commission to all those states acceding to CRAMRA.158 A Secre-
tariat may be established by the Commission as necessary to support 
the work of the other institutions of CRAMRA.159 The Scientific, 
Technical, and Environmental Advisory Committee's purposes are 
to give expert advice to both the Commission and the Regulatory 
Committees on all technical questions. 16o Membership is open to all 
parties to CRAMRA.161 
2. Operation of CRAMRA 
There are three stages to the mineral exploitation process envi-
sioned by CRAMRA: prospecting, exploration, and development. 162 
As soon as CRAMRA enters into force, any party to CRAMRA may 
begin prospecting in Antarctica without prior approval. 163 CRAMRA 
effectively overrides the Final Act because it creates a mechanism 
through which mineral exploitation can begin. 164 A prospector's 
Committee's decisions. However, the Commission "shall not assume the functions of the 
Regulatory Committee, nor shall it substitute its discretion for that of the Regulatory Com-
mittee." Id. The Commission may only ask the Regulatory Committee to reconsider a decision. 
It may not overturn a decision on its own. Id. 
156 Id. arts. 23, 28, 33, 27 I.L.M. at 879,881,884. 
157 Id. art. 28(2), 27 I.L.M. at 881. 
158 Id. arts. 28, 40, 27 I.L.M. at 881-82, 888. 
159 Id. art. 33, 27 I.L.M. at 884. 
160 ld. art. 26, 27 I.L.M. at 880-81. 
161 ld. art. 23, 27 I.L.M. at 879. 
162 ld. art. 1, paras. 7-10, 27 LL.M. at 869. 
163 Prospecting is the initial stage of mineral resource exploitation. CRAMRA defines 
prospecting as 
activities, including logistic support, aimed at identifying areas of mineral resource 
potential for possible exploration and development, including geological, geochemical, 
and geophysical investigations and field observations, the use of remote sensing 
techniques and collection of surface, sea floor and sub-ice samples. Such activities do 
not include dredging and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining small-scale 
samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling into rock and sediment to depths not 
exceeding 25 meters or other such depth as the Commission may determine for 
particular circumstances. 
Id. art. 1(8),27 I.L.M. at 869. 
164 For a discussion of the Final Act, see supra text accompanying notes 125-28. 
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"sponsoring state" must ensure that the prospector meets the finan-
cial and technical requirements of the Convention. 165 The sponsoring 
state also is responsible for notifying the Commission of the planned 
prospecting and providing an environmental impact assessment. 166 
The sponsoring state is the nation that petitions the Commission on 
behalf of an operator. Operators are strictly liable for any damage 
caused by their activities. 167 If a prospector obtains commercially 
valuable information, it can keep the information secret for at least 
ten years. 168 A prospector, however, does not automatically gain any 
right to the mineral resources it discovers. 169 
A prospector who determines that an area contains viable mineral 
deposits may ask its sponsoring state to ask the Commission for 
permission to engage in exploration. Exploration is defined as activ-
ities aimed at identifying and evaluating specific mineral resource 
occurrences to determine their nature and size. 170 The Commission 
must decide by consensus to open an area for exploration.171 If an 
area is opened, the Commission will set up a Regulatory Committee 
for the area. The Regulatory Committee accepts applications from 
165 CRAMJ;{A, supra note 2, art. 37(3)(a), 27 I.L.M. at 886. For the definition ofa sponsoring 
state, see id. art. 1(12),27 I.L.M. at 869. Article 8 defines the financial and technical respon-
sibility requirements for an operator. [d. art. 8, 27 I.L.M. at 872-73. Article 8(2) holds an 
operator strictly liable for: (a) damage to the Antarctic environment; (b) damage to an estab-
lished use such as the operation of scientific stations; (c) loss or damage to property of a third 
party or loss of life; and (d) reimbursement of reasonable costs to anyone who incurred them 
as a result of necessary response action where mineral activities result in, or threaten to 
result in, damage to the Antarctic environment. See id. art. 8(2), 27 I.L.M. at 872. 
!G6 A sponsoring state's responsibilities are laid out in article 37(7). [d. art. 37(7), 27 I.L.M. 
at 886. Article 4(2) states that no mineral activity shall occur until an environmental assessment 
has been made. [d. art. 4(2), 27 I.L.M. at 871. The environmental assessment shall include a 
finding that the proposed activity would not cause: 
[d. 
(a) significant adverse effects on air and water quality; 
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine environments; 
(c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of populations 
of species of fauna or flora; 
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of such 
species; or 
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance. 
167 See supra note 165 for a list of some of the activities for which the operator is held 
strictly liable. Under article 8(4) an operator is not held liable if the damage was the result 
of an event constituting a natural disaster of exceptional character that reasonably could not 
have been foreseen or an armed conflict or an act of terrorism. [d. art. 8(4), 27 I.L.M. at 873. 
168 ld. arts. 37(10), 37(12), 27 LL.M. at 887. 
169 ld. art. 37(1), 27 I.L.M. at 886. 
170 ld. art. 1(9),27 I.L.M. at 869. 
171 ld. art. 41, 27 I.L.M. at 888. 
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any interested operators and then either issues an exploration permit 
or denies exploration. If exploration is permitted, the Regulatory 
Committee develops a contract or "Management Scheme." The Man-
agement Scheme gives the chosen operator exclusive rights to ex-
ploration, as well as a presumptive right to development of the 
specified mineral resources at a specific site within an area. 172 The 
Management Scheme also defines the responsibilities of the operator. 
The holder of an exploration permit may apply at any time for a 
development permit. 173 Development is defined as activities that take 
place after exploration and are aimed at exploitation of mineral 
resource deposits.174 Before issuing a development permit, the ap-
propriate Regulatory Committee determines whether the original 
contract needs modification.n5 The Regulatory Committee may re-
vise the original contract only if the development application modifies 
the planned development previously envisioned or if the develop-
ment would cause previously unforeseen impacts on the Antarctic 
environment. 176 Once the Regulatory Committee has reviewed and 
approved the development permit, the operator can begin develop-
ment of the resource. 177 
C. World Park 
CRAMRA is much more detailed than the preceding summary. 
The foregoing section, however, provides a glimpse of the proposed 
system and serves as a basis for further discussion. Before examining 
the problems of CRAMRA, this Article explains the World Park 
proposal. Those who have attacked CRAMRA because they thought 
it would be destructive to the Antarctic environment have generally 
supported the idea of creating a World Park. To facilitate the com-
parison of the two regimes, the following section briefly describes 
the World Park option. 
The World Park idea originated at the Second World Conference 
on National Parks in 1972. 178 The Conference's participants unani-
mously voted to delimit the Antarctic as an international park. 179 
Since that time, several environmental groups persistently have 
172 Id. arts. 45-48, 27 I.L.M. at 890-92. 
173 Id. art. 53, 27 I.L.M. at 893. 
174 Id. art. 1(10), 27 I.L.M. at 869. 
175 Id. art. 54(3), 27 I.L.M. at 893. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. art. 54(5), 27 I.L.M. at 894. 
178 J. MAY, supra note 13, at 158. 
179 Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the Sea: A Question of Compro-
mise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 65 n.103 (1985). 
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urged the Consultative Parties to set Antarctica aside as a World 
Park. Their World Park proposal would be easy to implement. The 
proposal advocated by Greenpeace is a prototype of the environ-
mentalists' proposals. 180 Greenpeace contends that there is no need 
to replace the Antarctic Treaty System. As a result, Antarctica 
would remain demilitarized and free of nuclear activity. Scientific 
research would continue to be given top priority on the continent, 
and there would be even greater coordination of scientific programs. 
The Greenpeace proposal is essentially a continuation of the status 
quo with a ban on mineral exploration and development. 181 
To enforce the ban on mineral exploration and development, an 
Antarctica Environmental Protection Agency (AEPA) would be cre-
ated. 182 The AEPA would undertake independent investigations and 
assessments of proposed scientific activities, conduct inspections of 
base facilities, monitor operations, and prepare environmental reg-
ulations for all activities taking place on the continent. 183 
Until recently, Greenpeace's proposal was supported only by a 
small group of environmental organizations. 184 In 1984, the Consul-
tative Parties would not even consider the idea of a World Park. 185 
In August 1989, however, France and Australia announced that they 
would support protecting the continent as a World Park. 186 Because 
ratification of CRAMRA required their support, their announcement 
indicated that CRAMRA was in trouble. Following their announce-
ment, Senator Albert Gore introduced in the United States Senate 
a resolution that rejected CRAMRA and called for a stronger Ant-
arctic agreement that would preserve Antarctica as a global ecolog-
ical commons that would be cbsed to the commercial exploitation of 
oil and mineral resources. 187 In October 1990, the United States 
House of Representives approved a ban on mining operations in 
Antarctica. 188 Today, the World Park proposal appears a more polit-
ically viable option than CRAMRA. 
180 Greenpeace International, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 
Environmental Defense Fund, the Cousteau Society, and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean 
Coalition all have been active in advocating a World Park regime, and their proposals are all 
similar. 
181 See generally J. MAY, supra note 13, at 158. 
182 [d. at 159. 
183 For an overview of the Greenpeace proposal, see id. 
184 [d. 
185 [d. 
186 Lancaster, U.S.-Backed Antarctic Pact Criticized; Prospecting Could Pave Way to 
Ecological Disaster, Opponents Say, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1989, at A17. 
187 135 CONGo REC. S11,906-07 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
188 See The Antarctic Protection Act, H.R. 3977, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONGo REC. 
H9605 (1990). The Antarctic Protection Act requires the Secretary of State to negotiate 
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IV. CRAMRA OR A WORLD PARK 
This Article seeks to determine which proposal, CRAMRA or the 
World Park, is better for the Antarctic environment. At first glance, 
the obvious answer may seem to be the World Park. By preventing 
any minerals development, a world park necessarily would result in 
greater protection. There could be no risk of environmental harm if 
minerals were not being exploited. Upon a closer look, however, the 
case is not as clear. Political influences may make the world park 
idea unworkable. Consequently, it may be better to have a legal 
system like CRAMRA that could regulate mineral exploitation in 
the Antarctic. This section will analyze arguments for and against 
each proposal. 
A. The Argument for CRAMRA 
CRAMRA's proponents argue that, absent an agreement like 
CRAMRA, there will be unregulated exploitation of Antarctica's 
resources. They base their argument on several assumptions. First, 
CRAMRA's proponents claim that mineral exploitation currently is 
permitted under the Antarctic Treaty System. If CRAMRA is not 
ratified and mineral exploitation occurs, the Antarctic environment 
will be without protection. Second, even if the Consultative Parties 
prohibit mineral exploitation, the pressure to drill for oil may become 
so great that the Consultative Parties will allow oil to be drilled 
without creating necessary safeguards. Third, CRAMRA propo-
nents argue that failure to enter into a minerals regime similar to 
CRAMRA may cause a breakdown of the entire Treaty System. 
1. The Antarctic Treaty Permits Exploration 
Supporters of CRAMRA argue that failure to ratify CRAMRA 
will result in unacceptable environmental risks. They argue that the 
Antarctic Treaty currently permits mineral exploitation activities as 
long as such activities are consistent with the principles of the Ant-
arctic Treaty.189 The Treaty is not expensive, and it proscribes only 
international agreements to prohibit mining and to protect and preserve the Antarctic envi-
ronment. 
189 Although the Antarctic Treaty does not forbid mineral exploration, it contains several 
recommendations for protecting the environment. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2. The 
only impediment to minerals exploration in the Treaty System is the Final Act. See Final Act, 
supra note 127, at 865. However, the Final Act only requires parties to refrain from minerals 
exploration as long as progress is being made on CRAMRA negotiation. See id. 
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enumerated activities. 190 Since the Treaty does not address mineral 
development, it does not prevent mineral exploitation in Antarctica. 
Forces other than the Treaty, which could prevent a nation from 
acting unilaterally to exploit Antarctica's minerals, may have limited 
value. While a fear of causing an international dispute could deter 
some nations from exploiting Antarctica's minerals, that fear might 
be outweighed by a nation's substantial demand for scarce resources. 
Moreover, some nations may believe that their exploitation activities 
will not be challenged strongly. For example, the official position in 
the United States is that mineral exploitation activities are permit-
ted as long as they conform to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty 
System. 191 Thus, in the absence of a minerals convention, the United 
States might decide to act unilaterally.192 
2. Political Pressures Will Result in Exploration 
Proponents of CRAMRA have argued that the agreement is nec-
essary to avoid an unregulated scramble of mineral prospecting in 
Antarctica. 193 Neither the Antarctic Treaty nor the Final Act pre-
vents mineral exploration. A party legitimately could claim that the 
Final Act was only valid while CRAMRA was being negotiated. 194 
Because CRAMRA has not been ratified, the Final Act is no longer 
valid. Therefore, mineral exploration presently is permitted in Ant-
arctica, and no environmental protections are in place. 
Supporters of a minerals regime believe that oil will be discovered 
in Antarctica soon. Unless a minerals regime is in place before 
discovery, the pressure to exploit known resources will be tremen-
dous. 195 Supporters argue that some countries may want to develop 
Antarctic oil fields even if they are not profitable. For example, an 
energy-poor country like Japan might undertake unprofitable pro-
190 See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2. 
191 W. WESTERMEYER, THE POLITICS OF MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN ANT-
ARCTICA: ALTERNATIVE REGIMES FOR THE FUTURE 28 (1986). 
192 See, e.g., id. 
198 See, e.g., F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 232 (1982). Yet the same com-
mentator argues that a regime is needed to protect the investments of prospecting nations 
and corporations. See id. at 251. 
194 See supra note 187. 
195 Although the United States contends that the world supply of oil is now fairly stable, 
and that even world oil production could be sustained for about 50 years at the present rate, 
it still believes that a scramble to exploit oil would ensue if oil were discovered in Antarctica. 
See J. RIVER, THE WORLD'S CONVENTIONAL OIL PRODUCTION CAPABILITY PROJECTED INTO 
THE FUTURE BY COUNTRY 15 (1987). 
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duction to obtain an assured source of supply. 196 Additionally, some 
countries may even try to use mineral exploration and development 
as a way of bolstering their sovereignty claims. 197 More importantly, 
as the world's oil demand increases, and as stability in the Middle 
East decreases, some nations could face petroleum shortages. These 
nations may view Antarctica's resources as a solution to domestic 
difficulties caused by oil shortages. 
CRAMRA's proponents argue that, as a result of the pressures, 
the absence of a minerals regime will not prevent exploitation. Some 
nations will take unilateral actions without consulting the Consul-
tative Parties. Alternatively, the Consultative Parties themselves 
will feel pressure to allow oil exploitation. If there is a minerals 
regime in place, however, the Consultative Parties can ensure that 
the Antarctic environment is protected. 
3. CRAMRA's Defeat May Cause the Treaty's Defeat 
A third argument supporting the Convention concerns the future 
of the Antarctic Treaty itself. In the absence of the Convention, not 
only will unregulated oil exploration occur, but conflicts over oil could 
lead to the breakdown of the entire Antarctic Treaty System. Under 
the terms of the Final Act, all mineral prospecting is prohibited. 198 
The prohibition, however, has been largely ignored. Numerous ships 
currently engaging in "scientific exploration" actually are searching 
for oil. 199 If an oil field is found before CRAMRA is ratified, the 
pressure to drill for oil could be substantial. A claimant nation could 
assert that it has sovereignty over the mineral strike and begin 
exploiting it. A nonclaimant nation simply could begin exploitation 
by arguing that the Treaty System does not forbid exploitation. Any 
unilateral action of this kind could create intense disagreement 
among Consultative Parties and consequently put the entire Treaty 
System in jeopardy. The breakdown of the Treaty could result in a 
return to those elements that were present before the Treaty's 
negotiation in 1959, namely: the possibility of an arms race in Ant-
196 POLAR PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at 113. 
197 Other countries have used minerals exploration to establish sovereign claims. Before 
1925, Svalbard, an archipelago north of Norway, belonged to no country. Several countries 
entered into a treaty that gave them rights of access to the islands. Partly to consolidate 
these rights, six countries subsidized mineral development in Svalbard even though they 
operated at a net loss. See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 55. 
198 See Final Act, supra note 127, at 865. 
199 D. SHAPLEY, supra note 30, at 139. 
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arctica, a revival of territorial claims, and the uncertainty of a con-
tinent without any rules. 20o 
If geologists' theories are correct, one of the exploring nations 
probably will strike an oil reserve. The results of scientific testing 
are supposed to be shared with the other Treaty members to prevent 
the countries from hoarding information or from engaging in illegal 
pursuits like mineral exploration. This requirement, however, is 
difficult to enforce. The Japanese Agency of Natural Resources and 
Energy (ANRE), under the control of the powerful Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MIT!), has prospected in the 
Antarctic under the guise of "scientific research."201 The Japanese, 
however, have not published any details of ANRE's work. 202 All of 
the other Antarctic powers also have been exploring actively for oil 
in Antarctica. 203 This increased exploration activity suggests that 
the prospectors think that there is a real possibility of finding a 
major offshore oil or gas field. 
Hence, proponents of the Treaty argue that the Antarctic envi-
ronment will be protected much more effectively if there is some 
legal framework governing it. Without a minerals regime, the Con-
sultative Parties will be unable to control oil exploration, and the 
entire Treaty System could collapse. Under either scenario, the 
Antarctic environment would be in trouble. 
B. The Argument for a World Park 
To be workable, the World Park proposal needs to answer 
CRAMRA proponents' concerns about a legal collapse in Antarctica 
if a minerals regime is not adopted. In addition, the World Park 
proposal needs to present a viable choice. The proposal must be 
workable and must protect the Antarctic environment. The following 
section evaluates the World Park option from these two angles. 
First, it explains why CRAMRA will fail to protect the Antarctic 
environment and why a World Park should succeed. Second, it ex-
plains why CRAMRA proponents are incorrect in claiming that the 
absence of CRAMRA will lead to a legal vacuum. 
200 See A. PARSONS, supra note 46, at 14. 
201 Friedheim & Akaha, supra note 25, at 143. 
202 Id. at 144. 
203 See supra note 25. 
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1. World Park Will Protect Antarctica's Environment 
A World Park is needed because of the importance and fragility 
of the Antarctic environment. 204 It is difficult to imagine any oil 
regime that would not destroy the fragile Antarctic ecosystem. Even 
the United States Department of State's environmental impact state-
ment says that "future exploration and exploitation of mineral re-
sources in Antarctica could result in significant harm to its environ-
ment. "205 The impact statement recognizes two types of impacts. The 
first impact is the release of "large amounts" of crude oil into the 
Southern Ocean from tanker accidents and well blowouts. The second 
impact is damage to onshore ecosystems from the operation of sup-
port facilities. Both of these impacts could overwhelm the fragile 
Antarctic environment. 
Offshore oil drilling may not yet be possible in the harsh Antarctic 
environment. Therefore, it is impossible to predict all the difficulties 
that will be encountered. 206 Even if oil operators were to use perfect 
technology, accidents still could result from human error. A recent 
United States government study determined that those operating in 
Arctic and Antarctic regions are virtually certain to have acci-
dents. 207 Furthermore, the Antarctic climate will greatly exacerbate 
the effects of such accidents.208 For example, if a blowout were to 
occur at an offshore well, it would be difficult to stop the flow of oil. 
This would be especially true during the nine months of the year 
when the sea is covered with ice. 
An oil spill can destroy the local ecosystem. It even may weaken 
the entire continent's well-being because the Antarctic krill, which 
form the bottom of the marine food chain, will be contaminated. 209 
Spilled oil will be difficult to clean up. Oil takes much longer to 
degrade in the cold Antarctic temperatures than in warmer cli-
mates. 210 The recovery rate on land is also slow. Construction of oil 
storage facilities, tanker ports, or the exploitation of minerals on the 
204 See generally Kindt, Ice Covered Areas and the Law of the Sea: Issues Involving 
Resource Exploitation and the Antarctic Environment, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 27 (1988). 
205 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE 
NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES, at vii 
(1982) [hereinafter FINAL EIS]. 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 43-52. 
207 U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE 
ARCTIC AND DEEPWATER 163-201 (1985). 
208 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA: INPUTS, FATES AND EFFECTS 6 
(1985). 
209 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
210 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 28 (1978). 
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dry land areas of Antarctica would involve permanent environmental 
disturbances. 211 
Minor oil spills have occurred in Antarctica demonstrating the 
effects of oil on the continent's ecosystem. 212 The largest oil spill to 
date in Antarctica occurred when the Bahai Paraiso ran into sub-
merged rocks, spilling 170,000 gallons of diesel fuel into the ocean. 213 
After this relatively minor spill, about fifty percent of the limpets,214 
the food source for kelp gulls, died. 215 Studies report that the animals 
most affected by oil spills are those that regularly move in and out 
of the water.216 Hence, penguin and seal colonies would be extremely 
sensitive to even a small isolated spill. 217 
There are other unacceptable consequences of Antarctic oil explo-
ration. Antarctica plays a major role in regulating the global climate. 
Some scientists fear that a rise in particulate matter caused by 
pollution associated with oil and mineral development could alter the 
ability of Antarctica's ice cap to reflect the sun's heat, thus causing 
the atmosphere to warm. 218 Furthermore, an increase in pollution 
will ruin Antarctica as a global laboratory for monitoring worldwide 
pollution levels. 219 In sum, any mineral exploitation in Antarctica 
will result in significant environmental impacts. Even CRAMRA 
recognizes environmental hazards by providing for safeguards before 
oil exploration can begin. 220 
211 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 94. 
212 Spills in other locations give scientists an idea of how oil contamination will affect 
Antarctica. See B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 93. 
213 See Hall, supra note 59. 
214 A limpet is a mollusk of the intertidal regions that adheres to rocks and other shells. 
W. AMOS & S. AMOS, THE AUDUBON SOCIETY NATURE GUIDE: ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS 
(1985). 
215 Alerting the World to Save Antarctica, CALYPSO LOG, Apr. 1990, at 4. 
216 B. BREWSTER, supra note 14, at 97. 
217 "Penguin colonies along the South African coast were severely distressed by oil spilled 
in the collision of two tankers in 1977." Id. at 62. 
21R FINAL EIS, supra note 205, at 8. 
219 Id. 
220 CRAMRA, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 4, 27 I.L.M. at 871. This paragraph states: 
No Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take place until it is judged, based upon 
assessment of its possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and on dependent 
and on associated ecosystems, that the activity in question would not cause: 
(a) significant adverse effects on air and water quality; 
(b) significant changes in atmospheric, terrestrial or marine environments; 
(c) significant changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of populations 
of species of fauna or flora; 
(d) further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or populations of such 
species; or 
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2. CRAMRA Will Not Protect the Antarctic Environment 
CRAMRA's environmental protection provisions will not be able 
to protect the Antarctic environment properly. CRAMRA is weak 
because it lacks strong enforcement measures and is ambiguous. 
Article 4 of CRAMRA ostensibly provides enough environmental 
safeguards to prevent destruction of the Antarctic. 221 CRAMRA 
appears to contain relatively strict environmental protection mea-
sures. 222 The Commission must vote by consensus to open an area 
for exploration, and any single Consultative Party can veto explo-
ration. 223 Nevertheless, judging from the Treaty members' past per-
formance,224 it is unlikely that members will want to create dissen-
sion. Throughout the history of the Treaty, the Consultative Parties 
have hesitated to criticize one another.225 The lack of criticism when 
the French injured wildlife while building an airstrip at Dumont 
d'Urville illustrates this hesitation. 226 Many scientific bases in Ant-
arctica have failed to comply with a number of the Consultative 
Party regulations. 227 For example, there have been a number of 
complaints about waste disposal in Antarctica,228 and areas near 
research stations are badly polluted. 229 
The Consultative Parties have failed to enforce environmental 
rules in the past when there was not much economic and political 
pressure to develop Antarctica's mineral resources. Once oil is dis-
covered, it is doubtful that the Consultative Parties will have the 
political will to enforce stringent environmental requirements. If the 
international demand for oil becomes stronger, Commission members 
may begin to see CRAMRA's requirements as an impediment to 
their domestic oil demands. Because the interpretation of CRAMRA 
is up to those states that will benefit from any oil development, they 
may choose to open areas to exploitation even though such an action 
will result in substantial environmental damage. 
[d. 
(e) degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of special biological, scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. art. 8, 27 LL.M. at 872-74. 
223 [d. art. 22, 27 LL.M. at 879. 




228 Several of the management practices used at United States Antarctic research stations 
would violate United States federal environmental statutes. See Bogart, supra note 8, at 10. 
229 Liquid wastes have been observed being released directly into the marine environment 
at a number of bases. See Friends of the Earth, Cleanup Needed: Antarctic Bases a Shambles, 
48 ECO 5 (May 16, 1988). 
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There also may be difficulties enforcing CRAMRA's liability sec-
tions. Under the terms of CRAMRA, a multinational corporation 
can choose which country will be its sponsoring state. Because the 
sponsoring state is responsible for making sure that an operator 
complies with CRAMRA's requirements, an operator may try to 
choose those sponsoring states that interpret CRAMRA leniently. 
Furthermore, developing nations, hoping to obtain a foothold in 
Antarctica, may be inclined to pass less strict rules to attract oper-
ators. The international community suddenly may find multinational 
oil companies negotiating deals with cash-starved developing nations 
to operate joint ventures in Antarctica. The results could be dev-
astating. 
In addition to enforcement problems, CRAMRA contains dozens 
of ambiguous terms. For example, under article 4, no mineral activ-
ity is allowed if the activity will cause significant adverse effects on 
air and water quality. Article 4 also states that the Commission 
should not make decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activities 
without adequate information. Terms such as "significant," "ade-
quate," "reasonably," and "appropriate" are never defined. Instead, 
the parties are supposed to interpret the terms if a conflict arises. 
Unfortunately, the terms will be interpreted by Consultative Parties 
at a time when they themselves will have an interest in exploiting 
Antarctic oil. At that time, it is improbable that the Commission 
will interpret the terms in a manner unfavorable to themselves. 
c. Applicability of International Law 
Despite CRAMRA's weaknesses, its proponents believe that a 
minerals regime is the only viable option in light of global geopolitics. 
CRAMRA proponents claim that, in the absence of the Convention, 
international law would permit a nation unilaterally to begin exploit-
ing minerals in Antarctica. The following sections discuss why these 
arguments of political necessity are misguided. 
1. Functional Argument 
The first reason nations will refrain from unilaterally exploiting 
minerals in Antarctica is functional. It is unlikely that any nation or 
corporation would invest the large amount of capital necessary to 
fund Antarctic mineral exploitation without a guarantee that their 
claims could stand up under international law. Nations also might 
worry that they could lose their investment because of a military 
confrontation. While most nations have engaged in preliminary pros-
pecting, they have done so thinking CRAMRA would be ratified. 
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Those who have expressed an interest in Antarctic minerals have 
said that they need a miuerals regime in place before they will invest 
in exploitation. To invest in exploitation without any regime would 
be far too risky. 230 
2. Legal Argument 
The second reason nations will refrain from unilaterally exploiting 
minerals in Antarctica is legal. CRAMRA proponents contend that 
in the absence of a minerals regime, any party legally may drill for 
oil as long as they abide by the Antarctic Treaty. This argument 
assumes that no other international law applies in Antarctica. This 
assumption is mistaken. Antarctica's legal status is controversial 
because it is unclear whether claims of sovereignty in Antarctica are 
valid, or whether the continent is outside of any sovereign's juris-
diction. Despite this confusion, there are international laws that 
apply in each instance. In addition, the entire Antarctic Treaty 
System is binding on parties to those agreements. Regardless of 
how the disputed legal issue of sovereignty is resolved, there is a 
web of international law that will apply. 231 
All generally applicable rules of international law apply to Ant-
arctica in the same way they do elsewhere. International law in-
cludes specific international duties that apply to the protection of 
the environment. The first duty prohibits international environmen-
tal interference. 232 This duty prevents a state from causing harmful 
consequences to the environment of other states, or to areas outside 
national jurisdiction. This duty is manifested in international agree-
ments. For example, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration) declares that all states have 
a duty to prevent harm to the environment. 233 The second duty calls 
230 See, e.g., Tempest, France Urges Antarctic "Nature Reserve," L.A. Times, Oct. 10, 
1989, § 1, at 7, col. 1. 
A lot of countries that support ratification raise the specter of an unregulated scram-
ble to the continent. . . . But if you talk to companies, or particularly to bankers, 
and ask them if they would be willing to finance unregulated exploration, they say 
no. What they are looking for is a framework that guarantees them the right to be 
there. That is what the minerals convention gives them. 
Id. (quoting James N. Barnes, Executive Director of the Antarctic Project). 
231 Charney, The Antarctic System and Customary International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 85 (F. Francioni & T. Scouazzi eds. 1987). 
232 Pineschi, The Antarctic Treaty System and General Rules of International Environ-
mental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 188 (F. Francioni & T. Scouazzi eds. 
1987). 
233 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1466. 
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upon the states to cooperate in the duty of preventing and abating 
international pollution. 234 
If Antarctica is considered an international commons like the deep 
seabeds or outer space, then mineral activities there would be gov-
erned by international law. Because exploring for oil in Antarctica 
necessarily would involve detrimental environmental impacts, those 
impacts would be considered a violation of the international duty to 
prevent environmental degradation of common areas. From the 
Stockholm Declaration, as well as from other sources in international 
law,235 it is reasonable to argue that a country can act to prevent 
harm to the Antarctic environment before any exploitation occurs, 
by bringing a case before either the International Court of Justice 
or the United Nations. Several international court cases have ruled 
that nations have a duty to prevent environmental degradation out-
side their national boundaries. 236 
If Antarctica is not an international commons, then those nations 
with Antarctic claims may assert that international law does not 
apply because they are operating inside their own jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, international law still may apply to their activities. 
For the past thirty years, Antarctica has been functioning in a legal 
"twilight zone" between an international commons and state sover-
eignty. Throughout this period, Antarctica has been subject to the 
rules of international customary law. Under international customary 
law, norms first articulated in international agreements can develop 
into customary international law. 237 Since all the parties that have 
had contact with Antarctica during the past thirty years have shown 
their allegiance to the Treaty, it is likely that the treaty has been 
enveloped by international law. "The process by which [The Antarc-
tic Treaty] gives rise to a norm of customary law establishes new 
law which is separate from the originating treaty and would not 
change directly if that Treaty were to be modified or terminated. "238 
Hence, in the thirty years since the Antarctic Treaty System was 
adopted, the nations of the world have conformed to it either as 
234 See, e.g., World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37-7, art. 21(d), 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37-7 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983); Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, art. 30,29(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
31) at 50, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3281 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 261 (1975). 
235 See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 129 (1957); Trail 
Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1965 (1941). 
236 See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24 I.L.R. at 129; Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. 
Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965. 
237 Charney, supra note 231, at 84. 
238 I d. at 85. 
456 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:423 
signatories to the Treaty, or tacitly by accepting its rules. As a 
result, the Treaty System has been adopted as an international 
custom, and any nation that drilled for oil would be violating inter-
national law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although CRAMRA probably has been defeated, its supporters 
still think that some sort of a minerals convention is needed to 
establish a regulatory regime in Antarctica. However, regimes like 
CRAMRA provide little protection. Rather, they provide the frame-
work that multinational companies need to begin drilling for oil. 
Furthermore, if CRAMRA is not ratified, Antarctic mineral exploi-
tation cannot proceed without violating international law. It is doubt-
ful that any corporation will invest significant capital in oil explora-
tion without the security of international approval. 
The World Park proposal, in contrast, is simple and workable. By 
declaring Antarctica a World Park, the Consultative Parties will 
dissuade any party from continuing to search for oil. By preventing 
the discovery of oil, the World Park proposal will reduce the danger 
of environmental damage that would accompany oil exploitation. 
Additionally, by creating an Antarctic Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Consultative Parties would be creating an institution 
that could enforce international environmental laws effectively. 
